

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1324818-0

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director of Naval Intelligence

letter was furnished by the Department of the Navy's communication dated June 24, 1953. In summary, Summerfield claimed sporadic participation in an unorthodox study group which began in 1937 and the following year was penetrated by CP influence, and that he discontinued his association with this group in 1940. Summerfield also stated that he refused to give this sort of information and pretended no knowledge when interviewed by the FBI. (S) (U)

All information received by this Bureau in connection with the previous investigation has been furnished to your Department. Summerfield is not presently under investigation by this Bureau and it is noted that no additional credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature has come to the attention of this Bureau since the culmination of the investigation in 1951.

Your letter states that by virtue of his unique position as a recognized leader in the scientific community, Dr. Summerfield may direct or suggest research endeavors along unproductive lines, thereby preventing or delaying the fulfillment of necessary projects. In this connection you made reference to two memoranda furnished by this Bureau dated September 7 and October 31, 1960, subject Martin J. Summerfield. These memoranda set forth comments of [redacted]

wherein they referred to opposing theories on [redacted] and expressed concern as to whether or not there is an increasing number of questionable individuals gaining positions on technical journals from which they can control the information published and, thereby, impede advancement in this field. In this connection the name of Martin J. Summerfield was mentioned as the editor of the "American Rocket Society Journals". (S) (U)

In that this appears at this stage to be a question of evaluating scientific theory and in the absence of additional credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature since the conclusion of previous investigation, this Bureau does not desire to initiate additional investigation at this time. However, there is no objection to an investigation of Summerfield being conducted by the Department of the Navy. (S) (U)

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Director of Naval Intelligence

NOTE: [Navy requests investigation subject connected with Dept. of Aeronautical Engineering, Princeton U., Director of the American Rocket Society and editor of its publication. Basis for request is let from president of Princeton U. to Deputy Secretary of Defense outlining difficulties created by limited clearance for subject and requesting review of case. This referred to Bu in accordance with Supplemental Agreement IV of Delimitations Agreement.] (U) By way of background, extensive investigation conducted by Bu during period 3-49 to 6-51 and while no documentary proof found to establish CP membership, several admitted former members definitely established subject as participating member in CP. When interviewed on 2 occasions, subject denied membership and participation in CP. [Disregarding this info, Armed Forces Security Board granted subject "Top Secret" clearance 1-50. 9-51 Armed Forces Personnel Security Review Board revoked his security clearance. In 1953 Deputy Secretary Defense decided it was in national interest to permit access to classified info with his work at Princeton. ONI now desires investigation to evaluate subject for access to "Top Secret" classified data. Delimitations Agreement in part states investigation will be turned over to FBI when credible derogatory info of loyalty nature uncovered. Believe data furnished by ONI insufficient to warrant initiating investigation. Info contained in 2 FBI memos referred to by ONI relate to opinions only of 3 engineers re rocket theories and not basis for further investigation unless scientific authority judges these opinions have basis in fact as to possible espionage. "Confidential" because refers to info in incoming which is so classified.] (C) (U)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO  
Op-921KX1/ejd  
Ser 05512P92

18 JAN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Attn: Liaison Section

Subj: Martin SUMMERFIELD (U)

Ref: (a) FBI memo of 7 Sept 1960, subj: Martin J. SUMMERFIELD  
(b) FBI memo of 31 Oct 1960, subj: Martin J. SUMMERFIELD

Encl: (1) Copy of ltr fr the President of Princeton Univ. to  
the Deputy Secretary of Defense of 6 Dec 1960

1. In 1952 the Department of Defense denied Dr. SUMMERFIELD an industrial security clearance. In 1958, after a reconsideration of the case, the Deputy Secretary of Defense decided that in view of Dr. SUMMERFIELD's technical competence, it was in the national interest to grant a limited clearance which would permit access to classified information in connection with any work which may be done by Dr. SUMMERFIELD while at Princeton University having to do with jet propulsion, combustion and fuel systems.

2. By enclosure (1) Dr. Robert F. GOHEEN, President of Princeton University, outlined the difficulties that have been created by this limited clearance and requested a review of the case. The Deputy Secretary of Defense undertook such a review considering also the information reported in references (a) and (b). Before making a decision on the matter of Dr. SUMMERFIELD's continued access to classified information the Secretary has requested that a current field investigation be conducted.

3. Inasmuch as the Federal Bureau of Investigation has previously investigated Dr. SUMMERFIELD, the Deputy Secretary's request for a current investigation "with emphasis on the collection of any information which may reflect on Dr. SUMMERFIELD's present attitude toward the Communist movement" is herewith referred in accordance with Supplemental Agreement IV to the Delimitations Agreement. This case is considered of particular import not only because the counterintelligence documentation supports a conclusion that an espionage potential exists, but also, and of even greater significance, because of

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ENCLOSURE

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
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the sabotage potential. Dr. SUMMERFIELD, by virtue of his unique position as a recognized leader in the scientific community may direct or suggest research endeavors along unproductive lines, thereby preventing or delaying the fulfillment of necessary projects. Similarly, as suggested in references (a) and (b) he is in a position to suppress valid scientific theories. This form of sabotage is difficult to detect and even more difficult to prove.

4. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation undertake the investigation that has been requested by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.



HAROLD G. BOWEN, JR.,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence for Security

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Department of Justice  
Washington 25, D. C.

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY  
Princeton New Jersey

C O P Y

December 6, 1960

President's Room

The Honorable James H. Douglas  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Jim:

You may recall that I wrote you last December 30<sup>th</sup> about a situation involving the security clearance of Professor Martin Summerfield of our Department of Aeronautical Engineering. I appreciate the help you gave us at that time and wish that I could report no further difficulties. Unfortunately, the latest instructions limiting Summerfield's clearance impose on us almost impossible administrative procedures and seriously impede the availability of Summerfield's great talents. In consequence, I feel forced to ask that his case be reviewed again at the highest level.

In explanation of this request let me review the situation. By letter dated May 28, 1958, Princeton was advised by the Director, Office of Industrial Personnel Security Review, that the Secretary of Defense had reviewed the determination and recommendation of the Industrial Personnel Security Review Board and had determined that it would be in the national interest to grant an industrial personnel security clearance which would permit the effective use of Summerfield's capabilities.

Subsequently, under date of June 6, 1958, a clearance for Summerfield through secret, for access to certain specified technical areas, was issued to Princeton University by its cognizant security office, the Office of Naval Research, New York. This clearance (also referred to now as a Princeton access authorization) has been supplemented by various ONR guidance instructions, one of which imposed the peculiar geographic limitation which you helped to set straight after my previous letter.

Enough time has elapsed to provide experience with the adequacy of this clearance as a tool for fulfilling the purpose of the Secretary's original determination. We find that the limitations surrounding the use of Summerfield's clearance have made arrangements for his participation in classified meetings difficult and in some cases impossible. We believe that this experience warrants a re-study of his access authorization at this time, for the nature of research in the field of aeronautical engineering

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C O P Y

The Honorable James H. Douglas -2-

December 6, 1960

requires a rather broad access to classified studies. It is largely through such exposure that a person of competence uncovers areas in which he can contribute or propose to undertake new work.

Among specific examples which might be cited to support our opinion that Summerfield's capabilities are not being used effectively under present security arrangements is the recent instance of the Annual Meeting (December 6-7, 1960) of the American Rocket Society, of which Summerfield is a Director. At the present time, special studies of the state of knowledge in the fields of jet propulsion, missiles, and space exploration are being undertaken by the senior members of our Faculty Committee on Jet Propulsion to provide a basis for the gradual revision and extension of the University's programs in this field. Summerfield is Chairman of this Committee. As such, we believe that he needs access to the kind of information which is being discussed at the American Rocket Society Meeting -- and we daresay that he could have offered constructive and unique comments. However, his access authorization requires that a specific existing Department of Defense contract be held by Princeton University as justification for any request for security access. No such contract presently exists; so we were refused permission for his participation in any of the three classified ARS sessions involved -- Nuclear Rockets and Ramjets, Nuclear Rocket Vehicles, or Hybrid Rockets.

In addition to limiting seriously Summerfield's usefulness, the special nature of his clearance creates other difficult problems. As far as we know or can find out from discussions with our cognizant security office, the special limited clearance granted to Summerfield is completely unique. As a result problems arise at all echelons of the Government whenever a request is processed for his access to a classified meeting or discussion. Moreover the guidance instructions we have received from ONR impose on us almost impossible administrative problems.

In summary, the present clearance is very difficult to administer. We believe that Summerfield has a "need-to-know" which derives from his competence. However, the present limiting restrictions make it impossible to apply such a criterion, and it is obvious that his usefulness is seriously impaired by these restrictions.

Though we have no reason to doubt Summerfield's loyalty and trustworthiness and feel that the present limitations on his clearance are more

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The Honorable James H. Douglas -3-

December 6, 1960

likely to promote annoyance than security, we recognize that the value of our opinions is limited by lack of information. We have neither the competence, the responsibility, nor the desire to pass judgment. We do feel a responsibility to reiterate the importance of Summerfield's possible contributions to national security and to ask that this case be reviewed at the very highest level.

Your assistance will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

Robert F. Goheen

RFG:dpw

c.c.: Office of Naval Research  
346 Broadway  
New York 13, N. Y.

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